The myth of student choice by Brown, Roger
 Volume 2 (2) 2012
7Roger Brown
The UK Coalition Government believes that the key to raising educational quality is 
to empower students in various ways, especially by providing them with substantially 
increased amounts of information about provision and quality. The Myth of Student 
Choice examines the thinking behind this policy in the light of the available evidence 
about higher education as a process and about the nature of student decision 
making. It argues that, so far from raising quality, the present push on student 
information will actually damage quality, not least by reinforcing the reconstitution  
of the identity of the student from apprentice learner to that of novice consumer.
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‘The more information students have on courses and their outcomes, the more 
their choices will drive universities to improve’.
(Lord Mandelson, CBI Higher Education Summit, 20 October 2009)
‘Better informed students will take their custom to the places offering good value 
for money. In this way, excellent teaching will be placed back at the heart of every 
student’s university experience’. 
(Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 2011b, paragraph 2.24)
‘Markets cannot discipline price without meaningful information about quality’.
(Massy, 2004, p.31)
‘People investing in human capital through a purchase of higher education don’t 
know what they are buying – and wouldn’t and can’t know what they have bought 
until it is far too late to do anything about it’.
(Winston, 1999, p.15)
‘Education is a process pretending to be an outcome’.
(Trow, 1992, p.9)
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Introduction
One of the central planks of the UK Coalition 
Government’s higher education reforms is 
the empowerment of students through the 
enhancement of student choice. This is on the 
basis that both quality and efficiency will be 
improved as institutions respond to students’ 
decisions and ‘raise their game’ so as to attract 
or retain students and revenue. In this article 
I want to ask whether empowering students 
and strengthening student choice will actually 
deliver these benefits, or whether it will simply 
trigger a further set of costs, distortions and 
detriments.
I shall first describe the various ways in which 
the Government is seeking to achieve this 
objective, before considering the beliefs and 
assumptions on which it is based. Drawing 
on evidence from higher education and other 
scholarship, I shall then consider how far these 
beliefs and assumptions, derived essentially 
from the economic theory of markets, are 
appropriate to higher education. Finally, I 
shall look at the potential consequences. My 
conclusion is that, so far from improving the 
quality of student education, strengthening 
student choice is actually much more likely to 
damage it.
Before coming to the main argument, let me 
just say, for the avoidance of doubt, that I 
am certainly not opposed to students having 
and exercising choices about what, where and 
how to study. Nor am I against them having 
as much information as is feasible on which to 
base their decisions. My concerns arise from 
the weight being placed on this process as a 
driver of quality and efficiency, and from the 
very clear danger that, so far from improving 
educational quality, it will actually detract from 
the things that really do make for quality and 
efficiency, namely the adoption of the best 
educational practices within a well funded, 
diverse and integrated higher education 
system. There is also a moral aspect that I shall 
come to at the very end.
Enhancing student choice
Let us look first at how the Government is 
seeking to empower students as consumers of 
higher education. There are six main ways.
First, from this autumn (2012), the cost of 
teaching most subjects will be met entirely 
from the student fee, with institutions 
competing on price (within an overall cap) as 
well as on course quality and availability. This 
is in effect a voucher system. By mimicking 
as closely as possible a ‘real’ market where 
consumers choose with their own resources, 
voucher systems are seen by some economists 
as the best means of giving consumers 
leverage over publicly funded services 
(Friedman, 1962). However, so far the evidence 
about improved quality and efficiency is at 
best inconclusive (Belfield and Levin, 2005; 
Bekhradnia and Massy, 2009).
Second, the Government has removed the 
controls on the number of places for highly 
qualified students (those with AAB+ at A 
level and equivalent). This is intended both 
to increase competition and to strengthen 
student choice. Whether it will expand supply 
will depend on the universities’ reactions: 
past experience in both Britain and America 
suggests that many prestigious institutions 
prefer to keep their numbers down in order to 
preserve their exclusivity. In any case, whilst 
this partial lifting of numbers controls may 
increase choice, it will of course only do so for 
applicants with those qualifications.
Third, to widen the choice of supplier, the 
Government is encouraging more Further 
Education (FE) colleges to enter the higher 
education market. More than half the marginal 
places created under the new ‘core-and-margin’ 
funding methodology for 2012 entry have been 
allocated to FE colleges, although these may be 
offset by places being withdrawn by universities 
under existing agreements (Matthews, 2012a). 
The core-and-margin methodology is essentially 
a device for keeping fees down although it has 
been presented by the Government as a means 
of increasing competition. As a result, 65 FE 
colleges now have direct funding agreements 
with the Higher Education Funding Council for 
England (HEFCE) for the first time (Lee, 2012).  
The Government is also lowering the rules for 
provider entry. To be eligible for a university 
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title, a college with degree awarding powers 
now needs only 1,000 full-time equivalent 
higher education students compared with 
4,000 previously; only 750 of these have to 
be studying at degree level. At the same time, 
students on over 400 courses at non-HEFCE-
funded colleges are now designated as eligible 
to receive state subsidised loans compared with 
157 only a couple of years ago (Morgan, 2012).
Fourth, to improve the quality of student 
decision making, the Government is further 
expanding the amount of information 
that institutions are required to publish 
about their provision. It is also encouraging 
private companies to use this information to 
provide fuller information and guidance. The 
Consumers Association Which? has recently 
announced its intention to provide such a 
service (Which? 2012). The centrepiece of this 
enhanced information drive is the so called 
Key Information Set (KIS), setting out no 
fewer than seventeen items of information 
that will be available at course level for each 
institution from this autumn. These include the 
proportion of time spent in various learning 
and teaching activities (by year/stage of 
study, with a link to further detail); the mix 
of summative assessment methods used 
(by year/stage of study); the destinations of 
graduates six months after graduation; of 
those employed, the proportion in managerial/
professional jobs six months after graduation; 
and salary data (upper quartile, median, lower 
quartile) six months after graduation from 
the course concerned and for all courses in 
the subject across all institutions, six and 40 
months after graduation (the final version 
of the KIS is at http://www.hefce.ac.uk/
whatwedo/publicinfo/kis). Universities are also 
being ‘encouraged’ to publish anonymised 
information about the teaching qualifications, 
fellowships and qualifications of their teaching 
staff (HEFCE guidance is expected shortly). 
Fifth, the Government is increasing the ways in 
which institutions are required or encouraged 
to consider student interests, strengthening 
the student ‘voice’. Now in its eighth year, the 
National Student Survey (NSS) – a survey of 
third-year students’ views on their institutional 
experience – is seen as a key indicator of 
educational quality by students, institutions 
and the media (in spite of its many limitations 
for this purpose: Brown, in press, Chapter 6). 
Students are now full members of the review 
teams that periodically assess institutions’ 
quality assurance arrangements. They may 
also have the power in future to trigger 
institutional reviews where there are serious 
concerns about quality.
Finally, the Government is strengthening the 
ways in which students can obtain attention, 
action or redress for what is perceived to 
be inadequate service. For example, all 
institutions are being required to publish 
student charters covering: diversity, respect 
and communication; teaching, learning, 
research and assessment; finance; complaints, 
appeals, discipline; personal development and 
employment; student services (non-academic); 
and community, sports and social activities 
(Department for Business, Innovation and 
Skills, 2011a). In fact, charters will play a dual 
role: internally, they will frame the expectations 
of existing students; externally, they will play 
a promotional role in presenting an image of 
the institution to potential students. Following 
the lead given in the White Paper, the Office 
of the Independent Adjudicator on Student 
Complaints (OIA) has consulted the sector on 
a number of ideas that could promote and 
deliver early resolution of complaints. These 
include the creation of campus ombudsmen 
and associated support networks; the creation 
of a good practice framework for complaints 
and appeals processes, including possible 
timeframes; the development of an OIA  
‘kite-mark’ accreditation scheme; and a  
revised funding scheme that contains a  
case-fee element (OIA, 2011).
Of these various steps, the one on which  
I wish to concentrate here is the fourth: the 
enhancement of information (for a more 
general review of the reforms, see Brown,  
in press). This is central and crucial because, 
as everyone agrees, student choice is only 
meaningful if students are able to make well 
informed decisions about their future studies. 
Let us start by looking at the Government’s 
rationale.
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The rationale
The rationale was indicated in the earlier 
quotes from recent Government statements. 
It can be broken down into three propositions: 
(a) markets are the most efficient way of 
allocating resources; (b) higher education 
is basically a private good; therefore (c) a 
market-based system – or one as close to it as 
is politically and economically attainable – is 
the best means of providing higher education. 
If these propositions are accepted then the 
reform programme set out in the White Paper 
makes perfect sense. But if there are difficulties 
with them, markets may not be of the best and 
most efficient way of organising provision. As 
the formulation implies, the argument turns 
on the answers to two questions: (a) what sort 
of good or service is higher education? (b) who 
are the main beneficiaries?
What kind of good or service is 
higher education?
I propose to refer here to the work of a number 
of writers who have considered how far higher 
education can be seen as a good or service 
(see also, Dunnett et al., 2012).
Zeitaml et al. (1985, p.36) identified eight 
features that distinguish services from goods for 
marketing purposes: services cannot be stored; 
services cannot be transported; services cannot 
be mass produced; services cannot be protected 
by patents; service quality is difficult to control; 
service costs are difficult to calculate; demand 
for services fluctuates; consumers themselves 
are involved in the production process. Elsewhere 
(p.43) the authors speak of four unique 
features of services: intangibility; inseparability; 
heterogeneity; and perishability (duration of 
benefits to the consumer is also identified). 
Because of these characteristics, service quality 
cannot be measured objectively; instead 
the focus has to be on ‘perceived quality’, 
which results from a comparison of customer 
expectations with their perceptions of actual 
performance (Voss and Gruber, 2006, p.219).
Lovelock (1983) classified services, inter alia, 
by the scope for the exercise of customisation 
and judgement in delivery. Where, as in 
higher education, the service is created as it 
is consumed, and the customer is involved in 
the production process, there is far more room 
for tailoring the service to meet the needs 
of individual customers or clients. But by the 
same token it can never be clear, either to the 
customer or to the professional provider, what 
the outcome will be. Many writers (for example, 
Rothschild and White, 1995; Marginson, 2004; 
McCulloch, 2009) in fact emphasise the role of 
students as inputs into, and joint producers of, 
their higher education.
How do purchasers judge the quality of a good 
or service? Economists make a distinction 
between ‘search’ and ‘experience’ goods. 
‘Search’ goods are those where product 
characteristics such as quality can be 
established prior to purchase: most ordinary 
consumer goods fall into this category. 
‘Experience’ goods are those where quality 
can only be assessed through consumption: 
restaurant meals, theatrical performances, 
holidays all fall into this category. However 
Weimer and Vining (1992) categorised higher 
education as a ‘post-experience’ good, the 
quality of which can only be established well 
after it has been ‘consumed’, and perhaps 
not even then (see also, Nelson, 1970 and 
Hamlin, 1994). In the same spirit, Kay and 
Vickers (1998, p.308) used the term ‘trust’ 
goods, the quality of which is not apparent 
even after consumption. Similarly, Lovelock et 
al. (1998, p.219) speak of ‘credence qualities’, 
characteristics that customers find it difficult to 
evaluate even after purchase and consumption.
Cave et al. (1992) drew attention to imperfect 
observability and infrequent purchasing as 
major difficulties in applying market theories to 
higher education, together with the difficulty of 
changing course or institution. As regards quality, 
they distinguished between the provenance 
of the degree awarded, the quality of tuition 
received, and differentiation in course content. 
Neither of the first two can be observed in 
advance. The third aspect – the construction of 
the course – is more readily observable before 
purchase. But even here the relative merits of the 
course for a particular individual are less easily 
evaluated and there may be high search costs.
Rowley (1995) identified three features that 
distinguish higher education from other services:
•  Exclusivity of access: most customers must 
meet stringent academic and sometimes 
personal criteria.
•  The customer is an agent in not only their 
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own education but that of others: the 
notion of ‘exchange’, what the customer 
gives to the service experience, which 
includes but goes beyond price.
•  The longitudinal nature of the service: in 
measuring or assessing quality we need 
to consider not only the cumulative effect 
of the transactions but also the changes 
in students as learners, which may lead 
to developing or changing approaches to 
learning, learning styles and/or perceptions 
of the learning process (see also, Bolton 
and Drew, 1991). 
Who are the beneficiaries?
Clearly, the student is not the only beneficiary 
of higher education:
‘Perhaps the most important way in which 
education differs from simple consumer 
products is that it is not just the primary 
customer who benefits. The strangest aspect of 
the idea that the market can ensure quality is 
that it implies that there is only one customer, 
or type of customer... Schooling is unlike a 
consumer product because there are multiple 
stakeholders – multiple customers – who 
make multiple demands on schooling and also 
benefit from particular forms of schooling. 
Schooling and, more important, education, is 
not an individual benefit where quality can 
be judged solely in terms of the individual 
preferences of the person who is educated. 
Education is essentially a social and a moral 
affair. It is an activity in which the society 
within which an individual lives is actively 
involved’ (Walford, 2006, p.60-61).
In passing, one could say that perhaps the 
most fundamental difficulty with the current 
reforms is that, like the Browne Committee 
Report on which they are based (Independent 
Review, 2010), higher education is essentially 
seen as a private good and, moreover, 
one where those private benefits are seen 
overwhelmingly in economic terms (earnings, 
employment, benefits). Per contra, the public 
interest is mainly seen in terms of ensuring that 
taxpayers’ money is properly spent, as Dodds 
(2011) and others have pointed out.
To sum up this stage of the argument, we 
have a situation where (a) it is impossible for 
an individual to know in advance what quality 
of education they will receive if they enrol on 
X course at Y institution in Z mode, not least 
because they will be inputs to, and co-producers 
of, that process and (b) the range of potential 
beneficiaries goes far wider than the individual 
student. A number of corollaries flow from this, 
and it is with these corollaries that the rest of 
this article will be concerned. Before we come to 
this, however, there are one or two further points 
that may be worth noting at this stage.
First, even if these problems could be overcome, 
there are many other reasons why market-
based approaches have severe limitations when 
applied to higher education. These include 
(a) the need to protect the supply of public 
goods such as a skilled labour force, an active 
citizenry, etc (hence state subsidies, regulation 
and, sometimes, supply), and (b) the fact that 
universities cannot easily be left to close if there 
is insufficient demand for their courses (in spite 
of the rhetoric about failing institutions, not a 
single major, multidisciplinary, institution has so 
far been allowed to close by any administration) 
(for a full review, see Brown, 2011).
Second, there is an enormous amount of – 
mostly American – literature that attempts 
to specify the conditions in which effective 
student learning is most likely to occur. I will 
not attempt to summarise this here. But in 
view of what is said in a moment, it may be 
worth noting that it does not generally support 
the view that students will receive a better 
educational experience in a more selective 
institution. To quote Pascarella (2001, p.20):
‘Within-college experiences tend to count 
substantially more than between-college 
characteristics. The quality of teaching, the 
extent and nature of interaction with faculty 
and peers, the effectiveness of student affairs 
programming, the focus and intensity of 
academic experiences, and the overall level of 
student engagement, to name several important 
dimensions, are much more important in 
defining excellence in undergraduate education 
than the reputation, selectivity or resources of the 
institution attended. This is not to say that such 
factors as student body selectivity or resources 
have no role in shaping institutional impact. 
In some situations they do, at least indirectly. 
However, the weight of evidence indicates that 
their impact is substantially less than what a 
college does with the students and resources that 
it has’ (original author’s emphasis).
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In other words, it is exposure to effective 
educational practices that is the key to high 
quality student education (see also, Pascarella 
and Terenzini, 1991, 2005; National Survey of 
Student Engagement, 2001; Pike, 2003; Kuh 
and Pascarella, 2004; Pascarella et al., 2006; 
Ewell, 2008; Strauss and Volkwein, 2008; Lipka, 
2008; Ro et al., submitted for review). The 
same message can be taken from two recent 
UK studies (Teaching and Learning Research 
Programme, 2008; Ashwin et al., 2011; see also, 
Brennan and Patel, 2011).
Next, even if we had valid, reliable and 
accessible indicators of educational quality, in 
every part of every institution, that could be 
economically customised in advance for every 
individual student or potential student (and 
the challenges of conveying such indicators 
in an accessible way that avoids distortion 
and does not mislead the user should not be 
underestimated – see Baldwin and James, 
2000), there is little evidence either from 
the literature on consumer decision making 
generally or from what we know of student 
decision making in higher education that 
students would necessarily make use of them 
(Naidoo et al., 2011). On the contrary, we know 
that in reaching decisions about which product 
to buy, consumers generally, and students 
certainly, are influenced by a whole series of 
factors, of which perceived quality is only one. 
To quote one of the most authoritative surveys:
‘Our research found little of the calculative, 
individualistic consumer rationalism that 
predominates in official texts (Ball, Macrae and 
Maguire, 1999)’. (Reay et al., 2005, p.58).
Like many other consumers, student 
behaviour tends to be ‘adaptive’: students 
act in accordance with how they are normally 
expected to in the circumstances in which they 
find themselves (Hutchings, 2003; Jongbloed, 
2003; Kay, 2003; Vossensteyn, 2005; Stothart, 
2007; Cremonini et al., 2008).
Let us now turn to the corollaries of this 
fundamental problem with information about 
quality in higher education. 
The difficulties with information 
for students: the consequences 
for educational quality
If information about product quality is not 
available and students would not use it rationally 
even if it were, should higher education be 
provided on market lines in the first place? As 
Jongbloed (2006, p.25) has written:
‘If individuals are fundamentally rational 
and the problems are [uncertainty, imperfect 
information] , the potential role for policy would 
be to try to address these market imperfections 
by helping students make the decisions they 
want. If, on the other hand, students are 
fundamentally irrational, then giving them more 
information or eliminating market imperfections 
will not necessarily improve outcomes. In 
the latter case there may not be a need to 
strengthen consumer choice in higher education, 
as it might be better to, for example, let 
educational authorities offer the programmes 
they deem best for students rather than let 
student preference drive programme selection.’
Following the Browne Committee, the 
Government has in fact accepted that student 
choices should not be the sole determinants of 
what is offered by continuing direct subsidies for 
some ‘strategically important and vulnerable 
subjects’ and certain other priority areas. This 
reflects the desirability of not simply leaving 
the choice of what subjects should be taught to 
students. As Williams (1999, p.149) wrote:
‘Higher education provision determined solely 
by the wishes of large numbers of individual 
students would be unlikely to meet their real 
long-term needs, or those of society as a  
whole, as effectively as a system in which 
significant resource allocation authority is  
held by a democratic government, advised 
by expert agencies that can interpret the 
economic and social processes with which 
tertiary education interacts’.
The second corollary, if higher education 
is to be organised on market lines, is that 
consumers will seek information substitutes. 
This happens in other situations where market 
forces are intended to operate but where direct 
information about product quality is hard to 
find (McPherson and Winston, 1993; see also, 
Kay and Vickers, 1998). In higher education, 
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it has been well established that it is prestige 
that typically acts as the substitute (Brewer et 
al., 2002; Eckel, 2008; van Vught, 2008). Hence 
price is a key indicator of (perceived) quality: 
with all the experience of what happens when 
institutions are allowed to set their own prices in 
education markets, the Coalition Government 
really had no excuse for being taken aback 
when so many institutions went for the upper 
end of the fee possibilities for 2012. 
As well as charging the maximum the 
market will bear, the leading US institutions 
invest in improving admissions selectivity, 
lowering acceptance/yield rates and student 
consumption benefits: dormitories, eating 
facilities, fibre-optic networks, etc. (Dill, 2003). 
Other strategies to enhance prestige include 
renaming the institution and creating ‘honors 
colleges’ to attract higher scoring students 
(Newman et al., 2004). There is of course a very 
strong correspondence between institutional 
prestige, longevity and worth. In both the US 
and Britain there are huge differences in levels 
of institutional wealth: even after allowing for 
subject differences, Cambridge has over four 
times the income per student of Edge Hill (the 
differences in net assets are even greater). 
Calhoun (2006, p.25) has observed that the 
availability of elite status actually depends 
on huge inequalities of funding for different 
categories of institution. Current Government 
policies will of course increase these disparities 
(Thompson and Bekhradnia, 2011; Brown, in 
press). If input factors like resourcing levels 
or student qualifications matter, then equity 
suggests that any differentials should be 
reduced, especially as the more expensive 
and better funded institutions tend to attract 
students who have already had more spent on 
them than their less fortunate contemporaries.
A recent study of UCAS applications in 1996, 
2000, 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010 (Raffe and 
Croxford, 2012) confirms that in both England 
and Scotland there has been virtually no 
change in the hierarchy of Russell Group, other 
pre-1992 and post-1992 sectors. As Zemsky 
wrote in 2005 (p.287):
‘What the faculty and staff of both private and 
public institutions have learned is that in the end 
there is really no market advantage accorded 
to institutions that provide extra-quality 
education...What happens in this market is not 
quality but rather competitive advantage’.
Hansmann (1999) argued that much in higher 
education can be explained by the notion 
of student education as an ‘associative 
good’, one where a major consideration for 
purchasers is/are the personal characteristics 
of the other customers. What a university or 
college is selling is therefore, in large part, the 
‘quality’ of its students. This is still another 
consequence of the difficulty of obtaining 
direct information about product quality. 
Markets in such goods do not function like 
other markets. In particular, when not-for-profit 
firms produce such goods, there is a strong 
tendency for customers to become stratified 
across firms according to their personal 
characteristics. The incentive to sell by 
choosing only the best customers is especially 
strong for such organisations because they 
are effectively constrained to charge their 
customers, on average, no more than (and, 
often, much less than) the cost of producing 
the service. A private for-profit college would 
have a stronger incentive to use price as a basis 
for rationing admissions. At the same time, 
competition is dampened, partly because of 
larger gaps between the market segments and 
partly because of the high degree of inertia in 
the student body, over centuries in many cases. 
The whole situation has been well  
summarised by Dill:
‘Because the new competitive market is 
characterized by inadequate and inappropriate 
information, an ambiguous conception – 
“academic prestige” – comes to represent 
academic quality in the public mind, which 
can lead to a price-quality association 
that undermines productive efficiency. 
The distorting influence of prestige in both 
the US and UK markets means that the 
educational costs of elite universities provide 
a “price umbrella” for the rest of the system 
and present spending targets for less elite 
institutions that wish to compete by raising 
their prices (Massy, 2004). Competitive markets 
thereby encourage an academic “arms race” 
for prestige amongst all institutions, which 
rapidly increases the costs of higher education 
and devalues the improvement of student 
learning. As noted in both the US and UK, an 
unregulated academic market can lead to a 
situation in which no university constituency – 
students, faculty members or administrators – 
has a compelling incentive to assure academic 
standards. This is a recipe for a classic and 
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significant market failure in which the rising 
social costs of higher education are not 
matched by equivalent social benefits (Teixeira 
et al., 2004)’(Dill, 2007, p.67).
The third corollary, as both Jongbloed and Dill 
have noted, is the need for effective regulation. 
There is a paradox here. The 2011 White Paper 
and associated official statements speak of the 
need to reduce regulation if market competition 
is to flourish, hence fewer controls on funded 
student places, greater price competition, lower 
market entry barriers, etc. There is also to be 
a ‘risk-based’ approach to quality assurance, 
so that some institutions receive less frequent 
or intensive assurance visits than others. But 
what if the resource squeeze on the sector as a 
whole (with a 40 per cent planned reduction in 
current spending to 2014-15) or on individual 
institutions (increasing disparities again) leads 
to more cutting of corners and risks to quality 
either generally or on the part of the most hard 
pressed universities? It certainly seems ironic 
that at the very time when institutions are, by 
Government decision, facing an even more risky 
environment, that same Government should be 
introducing ‘risk-based’ regulation. 
There is a further difficulty. The regulation 
of quality in most higher education systems 
is a mixture of state, academic and market 
mechanisms (Clark, 1983; Dill and Beerkens, 
2011, and in press). In reality, most experts agree 
that in developed systems the key mechanism is 
academic self-regulation within, usually, a state 
legislative envelope (Kells, 1992). But market 
competition shifts the balance of power away 
from the academic community as the primary 
custodians and judges of quality and standards. 
To quote Marks (2007, p.173), judgements shift 
from being ‘authority-based’ (merit judged 
by ‘the authorities’) to being ‘market-based’. 
Moreover, quality is increasingly seen in terms 
of economic criteria such as fitness for the 
labour market. At the same time the focus of 
institutional quality assurance shifts from quality 
enhancement to reputation management (for 
the full argument, see Brown, 2009).
The final corollary is the amount of waste 
involved. Institutions put huge amounts of 
effort into producing, checking, manipulating, 
publishing and ‘spinning’ vast amounts 
of data, yet not one of the various moves 
to increase student information has been 
subject to a proper cost-benefit analysis. So for 
example, the projected autumn 2012 HEFCE 
evaluation of the Key Information Set (HEFCE, 
2012, pp.14-15) envisages looking at:
•  The user experience of the KIS widget, the 
KIS and the new Unistats website
•  Whether the process from HE providers’ 
perspectives can be improved on
•  An audit of the data provided by 
institutions.
No reference here to an analysis of institutions’ 
costs in producing this information let alone 
the wider costs and distortions, or whether 
these are or could be offset by quantified or 
quantifiable benefits. 
Similarly, universities and colleges invest 
increasing amounts of money in activities –  
marketing, branding, student recruitment – 
which have little to do with educational quality 
but are thought to be attractive to students 
and their sponsors. Hearn (2008, p.209) 
refers to Luettger’s (2008) estimate that the 
amount of money spent on marketing and 
communications by colleges and universities 
in the US has risen by over 50 per cent since 
2000; this is the average: the recent Senate 
report on for profit colleges (Stone, 2012) 
found that such institutions spend an average 
of 23 per cent on marketing compared to 17 
per cent on instruction. This may be why many 
American students pay far more in tuition 
than their colleges spend on educating them, 
something we shall increasingly see here as 
tuition fees take off after 2012. Much of this 
expenditure is of course in response to what 
students, as consumers, need or say they need.
In the UK, a number of writers (e.g. Rolfe, 
2003) have drawn attention to increased 
expenditure on marketing and branding as 
universities seek to maintain and improve 
their position in the market, even though 
much of this is ineffective (see also, Matthews, 
2012b). There has so far been less comment 
about dysfunctional expenditure on the US 
pattern but this can surely be only a matter 
of time. Most serious of all, however, is the 
waste involved where institutions invest 
resources in seeking prestige – for example, 
through increasing student selectivity or 
investing in expensive research ‘stars’– when 
only a small number of institutions can ever 
be truly prestigious: a zero-sum game with 
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a vengeance. These are of course resources 
that could and should have been invested in 
improving educational practices and facilities. 
Finally, we should note the contradiction 
between the idea of offering every student 
and potential student the widest possible 
choice, so that every student has the best 
chance of fulfilling their potential by studying 
on a course and in a manner that best 
meets their particular needs, and the clearly 
homogenising tendencies of having a single 
set of (mostly input-based) data to indicate 
institutional ‘quality’. There are in fact several 
sets of paradoxes here.
First, partly because of the informational 
problems described, and in spite of 
government rhetoric about the beauties 
of competition as each institution finds 
its distinctive niche, a greater degree of 
marketisation in higher education actually 
leads to a lower level of institutional diversity, 
as many students, institutions, employers 
and national agencies ‘migrate’ to a single 
preferred model of a well-resourced, highly 
selective, research-based university (see 
Brown, 2011, chapter 3 for the full argument); 
the ‘league tables’ of course reinforce this. 
At precisely the same time as Ministers 
are preaching diversity and choice their 
policies are actually reducing it. Second, the 
governments that have been advocating 
greater student choice are the very ones 
that have been cutting public expenditure 
on universities, so that institutions’ ability 
to offer a ‘personalised’ curriculum – for 
example, by increasing the amount of face to 
face contact between students and lecturers/
tutors, reducing the size of teaching groups 
and/or improving the speed and quality of 
feedback (all things that surveys consistently 
put at the top of students’ wishes) – has been 
significantly reduced (student/staff ratios in 
the universities are now, at 17.1, nearly two 
points above those in the state secondary 
schools, 15.3; in the private schools they are 
about half the state school figure). This is both 
a local management problem and a major 
strategic issue.
It is in fact strongly arguable that if the 
Government was really serious about student 
choice and empowerment, it would increase 
the resources for teaching in all institutions, 
something already desirable on economic 
grounds alone (McMahon, 2009). It would 
also require those institutions that obtain large 
amounts of public money for research to say 
how they are using that money to improve 
student learning and so justify the £9,000 
fee: I think we can guess the answer from the 
reported comments of Sir Stephen Wall, Chair 
of the Council of University College London, 
in December 2010, that the institution would 
be using the increased teaching revenue to 
‘fund the shortfall in government support for 
science and other research’ (Baker, 2010). The 
Government would also commit more of its 
own resources to develop information tools 
and dissemination: Thompson and Bekhradnia 
(2011, paragraph 84) pointed out that the 
Government proposes to spend £150,000 on 
information provision yet the running costs of 
the Student Loans Company and Her Majesty’s 
Revenue and Customs will increase by £10m 
per annum with the introduction of the new 
fee and repayment schemes. 
Finally, and again contrary to the claims of 
market advocates, instead of empowering 
consumers’ choices and potentialities, market 
methods of coordination actually reproduce 
the inequalities that consumers bring to the 
market place. As Ranson (1993, p.337) wrote:
‘Within the market place all are free and 
equal, only differentiated by their capacity 
to calculate their self-interest. Yet, of course, 
the market masks its social bias. It elides, but 
reproduces, the inequalities that consumers 
bring to the market place. Under the guise of 
neutrality, the institution of the market actively 
confirms and reinforces the pre-existing social 
class order of wealth and privilege’. (see also, 
Hemsley-Brown, 2011).
Whatever else markets may produce it is not 
social justice.
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Conclusion
It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that, 
at the very least, the current push on student 
information will increase stratification, both 
of the institutions and of the constituencies 
they serve (to the detriment of the notion 
of a diverse system where differences in 
resourcing and status between institutions 
are kept within a certain range); it will 
weaken self-regulation (the chief reason for 
our generally well-deserved reputation for 
educational quality); and will lead to a lot of 
nugatory effort on the part of institutions and 
students and their families, at a time of almost 
unprecedented economic pressures, without 
any corresponding benefits. 
Even worse, though, is the reinforcement that 
it provides for the notion of higher education 
as a consumer product just like any other 
(Williams, in press). This is completely contrary 
to the vision which many of us still have of 
higher education as essentially a process 
of intellectual and moral transformation, 
where the end product, if there is one, is a 
more enlightened individual better able to 
stand on their own feet intellectually through 
participation in a community which is devoted 
to searching out and understanding what is 
believed to be the truth through established 
scholarly means. Instead of a vision of higher 
education in which students are essentially 
consumers of a pre-specified product, 
we should be talking about an engaged 
partnership, where the key information is not 
what students can obtain before entering 
but what all parties learn in the course of the 
process about educational aims and how 
students may best achieve them. This is what 
is at stake in the enhancement of student 
choice and information.
Finally, there is a moral dimension. Is it fair to 
load upon students, at the age of 17 or 18, 
the main responsibility for making a choice 
of subject, course and institution, and for 
correcting it if it turns out to be wrong? Surely 
it should be the responsibility of the academic 
community to protect students by ensuring 
that, whatever, wherever and however they 
study, they receive a worthwhile learning 
experience leading to a suitable qualification? 
The very worst aspect of the renewed push 
on student choice and information is that 
it weakens our ability to provide those 
reassurances without putting anything 
worthwhile in its place.
You may now be able to see why, on the basis 
of what we know about higher education 
markets, student choice is a myth, and a 
dangerous myth at that.
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